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tional issue presented should have been 
considered. He indicated that, had the 
issue been considered, he would have 
held that section 554 does not infringe 
upon the constitutional right of privacy. 
Id. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187. 
In Scbochet v. State, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland considerably nar-
rowed the scope of section 554 by 
excluding from its application consen-
sual, noncommercial, heterosexual ac-
tivities between adults in private. Al-
though, as the court points out in its 
opinion, section 554 is still viable as ap-
plied to activities not expressly excluded 
by its opinion, the scope and constitu-
tionality of its application to such activi-
ties remains in question. By artfully 
avoiding the constitutional issue pre-
sented in this case, the court avoided the 
possibility of being reviewed by the 
United States Supreme Court. However, 
this has merely postponed a seemingly 
inevitable ruling which will define the 
extent of the State's control over the 
most intimate and personal aspects of 
the lives of its citizenry. 
- Mark K. Boyer 
Cooter & Gell fl. Hartmarx Corpora-
tion: VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT WILL 
NOT PROTECT PLAINTIFF 
FROM IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 
SANCTIONS 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
no S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the Supreme 
Court resolved a split among the federal 
circuit courts in their application of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The 
Court held that a plaintiffs voluntary 
dismissal did not destroy the jurisdic-
tion of the federal district court to 
award Rule 11 sanctions. Additionally, 
the Court held that the appropriate 
standard of review on appeal was an 
abuse of discretion standard. However, 
the Court ruled that expenses incurred 
in an appeal of sanctions were not 
includable in the amount of the mone-
tary award. 
Hartmarx Corporation ("Hartmarx") 
filed a breach of contract action against 
Danik Incorporated ("Danik"), who, 
represented by the law firm of Cooter & 
Gell, filed a counterclaim to that action. 
The district court found in favor of 
Hartmarx in both matters. Thereafter, 
Danik filed two antitrust complaints 
against Hartmarx, one of which was the 
subject of the appeal. 
The complaint in question alleged, 
inter alia, the existence of a nationwide 
conspiracy to fix prices and to eliminate 
competition. Hartmarx moved to dis-
miss the complaint and for sanctions 
under Rule 11 based principally on the 
grounds that the suit had no basis in fact. 
Danik filed a notice of voluntary dismis-
sal of the antitrust complaint which 
became effective in June 1984. There-
after, the court entertained argument on 
the Rule 11 motion. 
In December 1987, the district court 
granted the Rule 11 motion for sanc-
tions and awarded costs and fees for 
defense of the action against Danik and 
Cooter & Gell. The court of appeals 
affirmed, but additionally ruled that the 
matter be remanded to the district court 
where the expenses incurred as a result 
of the appeal should be assessed against 
Danik and Cooter & Gell. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
The Court considered three issues on 
appeal. First, whether a district court 
may impose Rule 11 sanctions on a 
plaintiff who voluntarily dismissed a 
complaint. Second, what was the ap-
propriate standard of review in the 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Third, 
whether awarding attorney fees incurred 
on appeal of the sanctions was autho-
rized under Rule 11. 
The Court first addressed Danik's con-
tention that its voluntary dismissal pur-
suant to Rule 41 (a)( 1) automatically 
deprived the district court of jurisdic-
tion over the Rule 11 motion, and thus, 
the sanctions and award of attorney fees 
and costs were improper.ld. at 2454-55. 
In its analysis, the Court considered 
both the language of and the purposes 
behind the promulgation of Rule 11 and 
Rule 4I(a)(I). 
Rule 11 requires that an attorney or 
party offering a paper to a court must 
sign that paper. By signing, the attorney 
or party certifies that: 
the signer has read the ... paper; 
that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnec-
essary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. 
[Fed. R Civ. P. 11.] 
If signed in violation of the rule, the 
court "shall" impose upon the attorney 
or his client "an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to 
the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause ofthe filing" of the paper. [d. The 
Court determined that the purpose of 
Rule 11 is to deter baseless lawsuits and 
to streamline the judicial process. Cooter 
& Gell, 110 S.Ct. at 2454. 
In contrast, the purpose of Rule 41 (a) 
( 1 ) is to limit a plaintiff's ability to dis-
miss an action without prejudice. Specif-
ically, the provision allows a plaintiff 
"one free dismissal" without the per-
mission of the adverse party or the 
court, provided certain procedural re-
quirements are followed.ld. at 2456-57. 
However, the Court stated, Rule 41 
(a)( 1) did not secure the plaintiffs 
right to file baseless papers.ld. at 2457. 
The Court reasoned that if a litigant 
could purge his Rule 11 violation merely 
by taking a dismissal, he would lose all 
incentive to investigate more carefully 
before serving and filing papers. [d. 
The Court rejected the petitioner's 
argument and found that the language 
and policies behind Rule 11 were con-
sistent with the district court's pOSition 
that it had authority to rule on the 
motion after the dismissal of the action. 
[d. The Court found that the jurisdiction 
of the district court was invoked when 
the underlying complaint was filed and 
was not destroyed by the voluntary dis-
missal. The Court further found that the 
Rule 11 motion was a collateral issue, 
not a judgment on the merits, and there-
fore, the imposition of sanctions did not 
deprive the plaintiff of his Rule 41 (a)( 1) 
right to voluntarily dismiss without prej-
udice. Thus, the Court held the award of 
attorney fees and costs was properly 
made after the voluntary dismissal of the 
suit. [d. 
Similarly, the Court rejected the peti-
tioner's contention that the court of 
appeals erred in applying an abuse of 
'-
disci'etion standard in reviewing the 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. In its 
analysis, the Court compared the lan-
guage in the Equal Access to Justice Act 
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("EAJA") to the language of Rule 11 
which it considered analogous. 
Under the EAJA, the federal govern-
ment must be "substantially justified" 
for its action or inaction. If litigants are 
forced to challenge the federal govern-
ment's activities in court, attorney fees 
may be awarded against the government 
unless its activities were "substantially 
justified." A district court's decision on 
that issue is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. at 2459-60 (cit-
ing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 US. 552, 
559-60 (1988». 
The Court reasoned that determining 
whether an action was "substantially 
justified" under the EAJA was analogous 
to determining whether an attorney's 
complaint was factually well-grounded 
and legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes. 
Both situations require fact-specific find-
ings which, according to the Court, the 
district courts are in a better position to 
make. Furthermore, district courts are 
"best acquainted with the local bar's lit-
igation practices and thus best situated 
to determine when a sanction is war-
ranted to serve Rule 11 's goal of specific 
and general deterrence." Id. at 2460. 
Since an abuse of discretion standard 
had been applied to district court find-
ings under the EAJA, the Court held that 
the same standard of review was appro-
priate for district court findings under 
Rule 11. Id. at 2460-61. 
Finally, the Court considered the peti-
tioner's contention that the court of 
appeals erroneously found that Rule 11 
sanctions may include attorney fees in-
curred as a result of an appeal of the 
sanction. The Court interpreted the lan-
guage of Rule 11 and the drafter's com-
ments as limited to those costs directly 
incurred as a result of the filing of the 
frivolous suit. The Court reasoned that 
o . 
the attorney fees on appeal dld not stem 
from the filing of the complaint, but 
rather from the imposition of the sanc-
tions by the district court. Id. at 2461. In 
that Rule 38 provides attorney fees and 
damages for wrongful appeal, the Court 
reasoned, the scope of Rule 11 is natu-
rally limited to fees connected with the 
filing of the complaint. Id. at 2462. Fol-
lowing the American rule that the pre-
vailing litigant would not ordinarily be 
entitled to attorney fees, the Court rev-
ersed on this issue. Id. 
In Cooter & Gell, the decision of the 
Court clarifies the manner in which 
Rule 11 should be applied by district 
courts. Now, even if a plaintiffvoluntar-
ily dismisses a suit, the district court may 
impose sanctions for violation of Rule 
lIon both the plaintiff and the plaintift's 
attorney, subject only to review for 
abuse of discretion. 
- Laura Campbell 
NOW v. Operation Rescue: INJUNC. 
TION PROHIBITING BLOCKING 
ACCESS TO ABORTION F ACILI· 
TIES IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STATUTE 
UPHELD 
In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that pro-life demonstrators 
could be enjoined from blocking entry 
to an abortion clinic on the ground that 
it denied women their constitutional 
right to interstate travel in violation of 
the civil rights conspiracy statute. The 
court affirmed the district court injunc-
tion on the ground that there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
The plaintiffs/appellees (hereinafter 
"NOW') were nine clinics that pro-
vided abortion-related services and five 
organizations devoted to preserving 
women's rights to obtain abortions. De-
fendants/appellants (hereinafter "Op-
eration Rescue") were Operation Res-
cue, a pro-life organization, and six 
individuals who opposed abortion and 
sought to have the procedure made 
illegal. 
NOW filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. They sought to enjoin Opera-
. tion Rescue from blocking entry to and 
exit from facilities that offered abortion 
and abortion-related services. The mo-
tion was filed, and granted, in anticipa-
tion of rescue demonstrations which 
were scheduled to take place in the 
immediate future in the Washington 
metropolitan area. Although the court 
enjoined the defendants from "tres-
passing on, blockading, impeding or 
obstructing access to or egress from the 
[listed 1 premises," it declined to extend 
the injunction to the activities that 
tended to "intimidate, harass or disturb 
patients or potential patients." Id. at 
584. 
The district court concluded that the 
defendants' activities violated the provi-
sions of 42 US.c. § 1985(3) (1988) by 
depriving women seeking abortions and 
abortion-related services of their consti-
tutional right to travel interstate in 
search of medical facilities. Id. To bring 
a successful action under § 1985( 3), the 
court noted, a plaintiff must prove a 
conspiracy to deprive any person, or 
class of persons, of the equal protection 
of the laws, or of the equal privileges and 
immunities under the law. In addition, 
the plaintiff must prove that the conspir-
ators committed acts in furtherance of 
their goals, thus causing injury to per-
sons or property, and depriving any right 
or privilege of a citizen of the United 
States. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 
F.2d at 584 (citing 42 US.C. §1985 
(3». The district court reasoned that 
rescue demonstrations were acts in fur-
therance of a conspiracy which inter-
fered with the right to travel in that 
many women in the Washington metro-
politan area traveled interstate to obtain 
abortions and abortion related services. 
Id. at 585. 
Finally, the district court concluded 
that injunctive relief was appropriate 
because: "(i) there was no adequate 
remedy at law; (li) the balance of equi-
ties favored the plaintiffs; and (iii) the 
public interest was served by granting 
the injunction." Id. 
The defendants appealed the order, 
arguing that there was insufficient evi-
dence to grant relief against three of 
their members. Id. at 586. NOW cross-
appealed on the ground that the scope 
of the injunction was too narrow, con-
tending that the district court abused its 
discretion in limiting the injunction to 
Northern Virginia and for refusing to 
grant the requested relief on a perma-
nent basis. Id. The arguments of both 
parties were duly noted, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower 
court. 
Citing the ruling of the district court, 
the fourth circuit court agreed that the 
defendants' conduct crossed the line 
from persuasion to coercion, denying 
women the exercise oflegallyprotected 
rights. Id. at 585. Further, the court 
noted that the district court holding was 
consistent with at least six other circuit 
courts of appeals which have similarly 
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